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STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE LIBERAL ARTS

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In an age when there are both the most confident assurance about knowledge and also the most profound diffidence, what are the consequences for liberal education? If we are content with the way knowledge now stands then there is no substantial worry. The educator's task is simply to analyze the means whereby that knowledge was gained into what are called "liberal arts" and teach them. But if what we consider knowledge does not satisfy us, then the problem is substantial and we must ask afresh what the liberal arts are. Dissatisfied with the state of knowledge but lacking its replacement and the liberal arts whereby its replacement is gained, we cannot really have liberal education. In that case the best we could do would be to call the search after the liberal arts itself liberal education. This may in fact be the best we can do.

Quite simply, liberal education is education that embodies and communicates the liberal arts, and they in turn are those disciplines of thought, imagination, seeing, hearing, acting, etc., whatever they in fact are, that lead to the truth about the perennial concerns of the human spirit.

Though broad and in the most crucial respect uninformative, this definition does have certain presuppositions which should be clearly stated. It presupposes, for example, that there are perennial concerns of the human spirit. These are such matters as the definition of man, his proper relationships to his fellow-men, to nature and to God. I know

of no civilization that has not in some way addressed itself to these concerns. To be human, at a minimum, seems to require that in one way or another these things be matters of concern as they apparently are not for the rest of creation. Even to hold that the ideal of human existence is to become as unconcerned as everything else is itself clearly a manifestation of this concern.

Knowledge about such matters is neither practical, in the usual sense of that word, nor knowledge for its own sake. It isn't practical in that it doesn't teach one how to make more money, build a house, cure the sick or alleviate poverty. It isn't knowledge for its own sake because these are matters of deepest personal concern that directly determine the character and quality of day to day life and would hopefully tell one what to do with the money one has or what a good society would be. We want this knowledge for the simple and selfish reason that we would like to know how to live truly well. Neither purely intellectual nor purely practical, this knowledge can be called spiritual, though the current disrepute of this word should not cause misunderstandings. Enlightenment, whether secular or religious, is what is meant. If this is too much to ask for, so is it too little to ignore it.

Secondly, the definition presupposes that it makes sense to talk about truth and falsity in regard to the answers that might be given to these concerns. At bottom this means that it is possible to say that some are better than others without this statement being merely an expression of one or another limited perspective. It is assumed that such statements can make some claim to validity that is rooted in the

way things are, an assumption that cannot be proved but is simply presupposed by the fact of the original concern. If youcan't say anything true about these matters then there is no point to being concerned and they might just as well be forgotten.

Finally, it is presupposed that truth in these matters, insofar as it is available at all, is available through disciplines of one sort or another. A discipline is something that has to be learned. It is not natural in the sense that it does not come without artful effort. An art, liberal or otherwise, is a production of the human spirit and will therefore always have something of a "contrivance" about it. It is therefore always associated with man and civilization. Even if one should decide that civilization is precisely the thing that leads away from truth, it would require a skillful effort, i.e., a discipline, to know this and to know how to divest oneself of the "rubbish" of civilization. Or even if experience, mundane or transcendental, is the key to spiritual enlightenment, discipline will be needed to prepare for the experience or to understand it once it has happened. This may be a sad fact, but it seems nevertheless true. If it is not, then there is no reason for schools of liberal education.

A liberal art is primarily a means not an end. It is more a habit or mode of thinking, imagining, or hearing than what is thought, heard or imagined. This reflects the fact that liberal education does not teach us

all there is to know about the human spirit but is essentially a propaideutic. It teaches us how to think, imagine, etc., and tries to inclucate the disciplines of thinking and imagining that lead to truth and root out those that lead away.

For this reason the liberal arts are quite fundamental and very controversial. Methods and means stand at the logical foundation of all human understanding, so that quite literally <u>everything</u> is at stake when we get around to talking about what the liberal arts are. It is easy to see the depth of the problem in a cultural context. For primitive man ritualistic action is a liberal art for it was a discipline whereby he came to know the religious and cosmological truths that determined his life. In India the various disciplines (yogas) outlined in Hindu religious-philosophical thinking were the liberal arts. For Plato the essential liberal art was learning to see the real as an embodiment of the ideal, and this involved such things as literature and mathematics. In the Middle Ages there were seven liberal arts which consisted of the disciplines of common speech (grammar, logic, and rhetoric) and those of number (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music). In the West generally, as our conception of rationality changed so did our conception of the liberal arts.

In philosophical terms the questions posed by the definition of the liberal arts are epistemological and methodological in character and hence are the most far-ranging and all pervasive questions we can ask. On the other hand, we cannot tackle the question of how we know apart from a determination of what we know, so that the discussion of the liberal arts leads directly to an evaluation of the contemporary state of knowledge.

So also do the concerns of the human spirit lead to the broad spectrum of the totality of knowledge. Because they are so fundamental, none of the concerns of spirit are answered apart from the others or apart from the current state of the rest of knowledge. What goes on in psychology departments determines to a large measure what we think man is, and what goes on there is very much influenced by what goes on in departments of biology, chemistry and physics. Questions about God are not answered apart from a conception of nature, and we cannot talk about politics and morals without some conception of what man is. Answers to these questions must be rooted in an overall picture of the way things are, and it is what we call knowledge that gives us these pictures.

These three elements, the conception of the human spirit, the disciplines of knowledge, and the general state of knowledge are internally bound up with each other in an organic, mutually dependent manner. Changes in the state of knowledge effect corresponding changes in the way the disciplines are conceived that lead to knowledge and entail changes in the answers to the questions of the human spirit, and vice-versa. This does not hold for all changes of course. Not every bit of research alters our fundamental outlook. The mutual relations between the disciplines, the state of knowledge, and the conception of the human spirit are much looser and slow moving than this. It is only major or revolutionary changes in one or the other that significantly alter the rest. The periods between the revolutions correspond to historical and cultural epochs wherein great numbers of people share common answers to the questions of the human spirit and agree generally on a conception of knowledge and the disciplines that

lead to it. It is always possible for an individual with an encyclopedic mind to construct a world of his own, and this one may be better than any that have come to be embodied in cultures, but the conceptions of man, the disciplines of knowing, and knowledge itself around which large numbers of people can gather will always correspond to a general cultural millieu. Questions about liberal education will then always be bound up with the state of culture generally.

Discussions of liberal education often begin by asking what the liberal arts are for our age. The question implies that the solution to the problems of liberal education lies in an analysis of the state of knowledge as it is right now, the explication of the disciplines of thought that lead to this knowledge, and the embodiment of those disciplines in a program directed towards the questions of human spirituality. A school constructed on such a basis could not be called a bad school, or at least it would probably not have the usual faults of our schools. But whether or not it would answer the current crisis in the schools is unclear. It is a fundamentally historicist approach to the questions of liberal education. The state of knowledge and current conceptions of human spirituality are not questioned. They are accepted because they are "ours" and the latest thing we have to offer, and, of course, the implication is that they are therefore the best.

use their classrooms to preach their gospels, reenforcing thereby the student's feelings. They are likely to be popular teachers and unhappy men, feeling they must continually fight their professions if they are to accomplish what seems to them significant.

Though it cannot be proved, this is a plausible picture. It is basically the situation at most colleges right now, and what is indicated is that the answer to the problems of liberal education does not lie in this sort of updating or sophistication of the usual college curriculum. The two are basically the same, so that insofar as the question of alienation goes deeper than mere "updatings" of the curriculum the idea of a contemporary version of the liberal arts does not meet it at all. In fact, it aggravates the situation, for the root cause of the current alienation is precisely the state of knowledge embodied in the updated curriculum with its consequent picture of man. It is the updated liberal arts themselves that are at issue. They are what are being judged and found inadequate by students and faculty alike on our campuses everywhere. They are the problem, not the solution.

The disciplines and methods that lead to knowledge and understanding, that is, the liberal arts, that knowledge itself, and a conception of man or human spirituality tend all to come together in a more or less coherent world-view that usually embodies a culture. But it will come as no surprise to declare that our culture is in fact on trial. Our conception of knowledge has led us to a picture of the human spirit that everywhere within our culture people are declaring they refuse to live with, will not accept, and are fleeing in any and every way they can. Our art,

ture. Finally, in philosophy he would be introduced to the techniques of linguistic analysis and would be taught the powers and limitations of reason as found therein. In addition to all this, he will of course get some training for a particular profession.

Our graduate would be a thoroughly modern man, and insofar as the school has been able to influence him he will be happily acclimatized to our contemporary culture. He will be a practitioner of its liberal arts and a believer in its conception of man. Happily he will leave the field of commencement either to join his fellow citizens in productive labor or to go on to graduate school eager to become a colleague in the invincible advance of knowledge.

Except perhaps for students of the sciences we know that this rosy picture is pure fiction. The others are likely to become indifferent to their studies. They are likely to condemn them as irrelevant, not just to pressing social needs but to themselves personally. They are likely to feel alienated, as if strangers living in a foreign culture not quite to their taste, and no amount of intensified student-faculty relationships or other such gimmicks will cure this. Some of them will seek answers to the questions that mean the most to them outside the school, either through drugs, infatuations with exotic religions, radical political activism, or group therapy of one kind or another. Those not so radically inclined will leave the school feeling indifferent, uncomfortable, and rather lost.

Nor will the faculty fall in line quite so happily. Most will accept the school's basic ideas, but here and there will be found those faculty members who share the students alienation and in one way or another

It would not be difficult to outline such a program. With some differences this has in fact been done by Daniel Bell in The Reforming of General Education and will soon be embodied in reality if the program for Hampshire College as described in The Making of a College is realized. The essence of the idea is to concentrate on teaching the most current techniques and methods of discovery in the various fields rather than on the mass of theory and information based on that research. This is done for the reason that the theory and information of the fields are rapidly outdated, but the basic methods persist. But these methods in fact are the liberal arts of contemporary culture. They are the disciplines of mind by which we think the truth is known. Put in a context wherein the basic questions of human concern are discussed this program is quite properly called a contemporary version of the liberal arts.

After four years in such a school the student possesses at least some knowledge of the basic ways in which knowledge or understanding is gained in all the fields of human endeavor. Of physics and the "hard" sciences he would at least know about current conceptions of hypothesis and confirmation, prediction and explanation, and the other fundamental methodological concepts of the sciences that determine our culture's fundamental outlook towards nature. Similarly in the social sciences the latest methods and assumptions employed by those attempting to turn the study of man into something as "solid" as the hard sciences would be presented as the principles to be learned. In the arts and literature the student would be taught to appreciate the twistings and turnings of modern art and would appropriate the picture of man found in contemporary litera-

literature and some of our philosophy, as a result of the state of knowledge in the other disciplines, have come to see man as a lonely creature, alienated from God, nature, fellow man, and self, struggling desperately to make something out of nothing in order to find solace. This theme has in fact become platitudinous so pervasive is its influence. Yet, in all the activities of the student radicals, drop-outs, and rebels of one sort or another, we find the attempt to escape precisely this picture. In politics we find the intense yearning for community and it is now being realized that this entails the abolition of the liberal's plurality of atomic individuals. This is a rejection of the isolation (autonomy) of the individual, the liberal ideal, which was in turn based on the supposed inability of the human mind to reach valid conclusions in matters of morals, politics and aesthetics, a state of mind clearly influenced by the rise of science and its conception of knowledge. In the fashionable encounter group we find another attempt to overcome the alienation of man from man. In drugs there lies an entire conception of reality and hence a new way of looking at nature and the physical world, while the interest in oriental religions is self-explanatory.

All of these items, and many more less dramatic ones, must be seen as reactions to and rejections of contemporary culture, its conception of knowledge, the disciplines that lead to knowledge, and its answers to the questions of human spirituality. This is not to say they are valid reactions or even well-understood, but the depth of the problem to which they point must be realized. It is the entire world view of contemporary culture,

from physics to philosophy to painting that is at issue, though this is not always quite realized even by the rebels.

Our culture is, if anything, scientific, and the crowning glory of our science is physical science. Physics is quite simply the study of nature in its most fundamental aspects and it is as old as man's desire to comprehend himself, for the fact that men exist in and as a part of nature (the world) makes an understanding of nature essential to an understanding of man. The way man thinks of himself will thus affect the way he thinks of nature and conversely his conception of nature will affect his conception of himself. In the pre-modern era, this connection was more apparent and more immediately felt, as can be easily seen in a study of mythology or Greek and Indian science. But the revolution in thinking which made modern physics possible and determined the course of the entire modern age consisted precisely in the attempt to divorce nature from the realm of spiritual concern. Descartes' *res extensa* and *res cogitans* express the new way of looking at the world as succintly and clearly as possible. Mind, spirit, and thought are one thing, nature another, the point of contact between them obscure and barely intelligible. There are the world as it is in itself and the world as it is lived in by men. The quest for certainty leads to the conception of the former as mere extension, something to which only the category of quantity applies, the other categories of human thought, value, purpose, and "meaning," becoming mere "anthropomorphisms." The philosophical groundwork for mathematical physics and em-

pirical methodology is laid, at the cost of the exile of man from his world. The world is no longer explicable to the concerns of spirit.

Given this change in man's thinking about nature, the steps through Newton's discoveries to the new physics of our own time are minor. Nor has the new physics, as is sometimes intimated, altered this fundamental perspective. If anything, it has deepened the gulf between things spiritual and things natural. True, the universe is no longer conceived as mechanistically as it was, but in the process physics became a sort of sublime metorology wherein fruitfulness of predictions becomes the supreme test of truth, allowing the most bizarre and unintelligible statements, especially in mathematics, to receive empirical "confirmation." All of this serves only to divorce nature still further from primary human consciousness and concern.

Pursuing this course of action, physics has won for itself a general esteem unparalleled in the history of man's attempts to know, aided to no small measure by the technology attendant upon its theorizing. It is hard to bear in mind that contemporary physics is but one attempt to understand nature, but one version of a science of nature. As the word "science," which originally meant simply "knowledge," has come to mean those particular methods and types of theories found in contemporary science, so has "physics" (as we currently conceive it) become synonomous with the study of nature generally. The possibility of alternative conceptions of nature that can lay claim to "objectivity" seems so remote that one is embarrassed even to consider them. But of still more consequence than the particular theories of physics has been the adoption of its methods

and epistemology in one way or another by virtually every field of inquiry.

Descartes' original vision called for the reduction of biological phenomena to physical phenomena, and recent developments in our own time seem to indicate that biology will concentrate its energies in this direction. Biology will apparently become a branch of chemistry, with chemistry a branch of physics.

The social sciences are young, so we are told, and hence cannot be expected as yet to have the sophistication of the "hard" sciences. But in the same breath we are assured that they will eventually triumph. How? By emulating as closely as possible the methods of physics. If social phenomena are not as predictable as physical we shall use statistics and have our mathematics anyway. The opinion poll provides a way of dealing with concepts too subtle to be treated directly by scientific methods, and we shall certainly keep the social sciences as value free and properly empirical as possible. Questions of the proper purposes and means of society are not to be dealt with, or if they must be, then relegate them to freshman courses in "theory" or philosophy.

Psychology may be in the most chaotic state of all the sciences with myriads of competing methods and basic outlooks. But here, too, one suspects that the model of physics will eventually prove victorious. As a result, pyschic phenomena will be reduced to complex concatinations of behavior patterns or biochemical phenomena, and, no doubt, a technology of the human soul will be produced.

Nor is the effect of the success of physics limited to the sciences. Much is made of "the two cultures" and we are led to suppose that the

sciences and the humanities have two radically different ways of viewing the world. Yet, it seems that the humanities have really defined themselves in terms promulgated by the scientists and are essentially reactions to science rather than entities.

There is the pervasive opinion that the humanities are concerned more with emotions, feelings, intuitions, etc., rather than the cold rationality of the sciences. This abyssmal distinction is, of course, merely another aspect of the Cartesian dualism which was instituted, we recall, for the sake of science, not feeling. Feeling and so on were the bones Descartes threw to everything he was not willing to call knowledge, and in our time the arts and humanities have eagerly grabbed for them. This represents nothing but a capitulation of the truly knowable to science based on the misidentification of rationality and scientific method, a misidentification promulgated by science's philosophical apologists.

By and large, literature and the arts have accepted the basic view of the world promulgated by the sciences and instead of offering us alternative worlds have been content merely to depict the impact of the scientific world view on the human soul, a theme which, as was said, has now become platitudinous. Or art has itself become a kind of technology, reveling in bare technique, forgetting that art is integrally related to man's spiritual needs. Here and there it must be said the arts have made some attempt to offer new modes of understanding, but accepting science's opinion of their proper methods this has been done through the celebration of subjectivity, neurosis, hallucination or the "creative process." By and large, our art is an art of despair over a lost spiritual vision, struggling occasionally

for a way out but being defeated by its very conception of how to begin.

Philosophy, the once place at least where one might find alternatives, reflects the general situation with dismaying precision. Metaphysics, or the construction of speculative visions of man and the world, has all but disappeared, practiced here and there only by a few older men who are regarded by the profession as charming antiques at best or hideous anachronisms at worst. Of the two dominant schools in the West today, analytic philosophy pays homage to science by reducing itself to a branch of mathematics, linguistics, or lexicography, while existentialism joins art in disparaging the intellect, preferring the exotic, the spontaneous or the mute. Religion, where it still exists in the universities, instead of offering alternative understandings, seems to be all too anxious to secularize itself in the name of progress.

Only in the areas of history and comparative culture is there to be found a serious consideration of alternative visions, and even there it is infrequent and ineffective. In the history of ideas generally and in the historical scholarship of the various disciplines (literature, art, religion, philosophy, and science) are found, occasionally, men imaginatively attempting to understand alternative conceptions of man and the world and possibly even to defend them. But this scholarship is too often merely historical and lacks the freshness and directness of original thinking. It tends too much towards historical sentimentality, and is too often carried on without an adequate understanding of the contemporary world.

In general then the universities present a picture of the world determined essentially by the physical sciences and their methods. In all of the sciences men are eagerly working to apply those methods to their own subject matters, so that the projected point of ideal achievement would be the unification of all phenomena under the banner of the physical sciences, a complete system totally indifferent to the concerns of the human spirit yet determining our conception of spirit. Philosophy and the arts offer no way out but only record this trend with ever increasing precision, or, when they do offer an alternative do so at the price of public truth, celebrating the private and personal. Between the cold irrelevancy of the sciences and the hot irrelevancy of art the concerns of spirit are forgotten, either its questions declared meaningless and "odd," or its questions declared healthy but their answers unavailable. The price for all this is what we have come to call alienation, both personal and political and also metaphysical.

The liberal arts, and indeed our culture generally, are in difficult straits, and the cause of the problem is precisely our conception of the liberal arts and the world view they lead to. But to recognize the problem is not to have a solution, and this is the predicament most people sharing these views find themselves in. The sheer enormity and depth of the problem is itself debilitating, but even without that it would remain true that by and large we have little or no idea of where or how to begin solving it.

In education this has the consequence that we are called upon to say what the liberal arts are for a culture or world view that does not yet exist. To solve the educational dilemma we would have to say what the disciplines are that lead to truth before knowing the truths to which they are supposed to lead, an impossible task. Is logic the key discipline, and if so which of the myriads of logics shall we choose, each with its own metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions? Or is it poetic imagination that needs to be emphasized? Should we introduce meditation as a new (for the West) liberal art, or perhaps the Zen art of flower arrangement which is supposed to be a discipline that leads to enlightenment? Are math and science with their host of disciplines simply the enemy, to be fled or conquered, or can they be "humanized" and become a part of a richer understanding of the world? Obviously, one does not answer such questions without having a good idea of where the choice will lead, and so we do not know how to answer them. From this point of view liberal education does not seem possible.

On the other hand, neither can the schools do nothing, for the students, who are much more aware of this problem than the faculty, will not let them. Lost in the minutae of professionalism, faculty members tend to forget the original impulses that led them to become professional truth-seekers, or, if they do remember, are reluctant to talk about these things professionally. Sometimes they simply adopt the attitude that the questions of human spirituality might just as well go unasked. This is just another symptom of the condition of knowledge in our culture, and reenforces in the student the feeling that the universities are irrelevant. Meanwhile, the students go where they can find something that meets their

needs, to local gurus, soapbox politicos or itinerant healers of hurt souls. Their need will be met, one way or another, intelligently or unintelligently, calmly or angrily. It would be far better if the schools themselves met the challenge and undertook the painful job of self-criticism at the most fundamental level.

But it is no mean task to define a curriculum that embodies the disciplines that lead to truth when one does not know the truths to which the disciplines are supposed to lead. How can a school take as its subject matter knowledge which does not yet exist? There might be many ways of responding to this paradox, but one thing seems clear -- such a school would have to fundamentally alter the usual student teacher relationship. The teacher could not be simply the one who knows and the student the one who receives. The teacher here would quite literally not know, but would be, presumably, one seeking the kind of discipline and knowledge we have been talking about. Consequently, the student must join the teacher in this research either as critic or co-worker, but at any rate could not remain a receptacle for the other's knowledge. In other words, it seems that a school attempting to meet this challenge would have to be not an institution wherein knowledge is passed on but one wherein it is sought -- a research institute, if that phrase has not too Cartesian an overtone. Both students and faculty would have to view themselves as essentially involved finding knowledge rather than transmitting or receiving it. They would be, in effect, junior and senior researchers. This, of course, does not mean the distinction entirely breaks down. There would still be no substitute for the faculty member's experience, even if often it is more hindrance than

help, and this entails considerable difference in role. But essentially the relationship would have to be altered in a way that is potentially quite exciting.

But given this, what one still needs is a program of some sort which would embody and give substance to the idea of seeking a new and better conception of man and the world. The problem of course is that discovery cannot be programmed, and you can't have a class on a book that hasn't been written. It would usually be an individual alone who would undertake a task such as this, and it is indeed difficult to imagine an entire community undertaking such a project together. Yet, if the matter were left entirely to individuals all one would have to call a college is a collection of exotic courses.

The situation is not entirely dark, however. As mentioned before, in the areas of the history of ideas and cross cultural studies is found something like the sort of thinking that is desired. There we find men discovering, explicating, and sometimes even evaluating alternative worlds of every kind, from those of primitive mythology to Oriental religions and Greek rationalism. If this activity could be made not simply historical but problematic and could be put in a context wherein it served as the propaideutic to a non-historical meeting of the contemporary problems it might serve well as the basis for this sort of program. It would have the tremendous virtues of making plausible the possibility of seeking alternative worlds by bringing us face to face with such worlds as they were actually lived by men, and it would further serve to loosen up the con-

strained way of thinking to which students and faculty, whether rebels or conservatives, have grown accustomed.

There are many ways to structure the program. A course inphysics might be a year and a half to two years long and might study in detail the ways of looking at material things in five or so radically different cultures. Similarly, there could be courses in drama, theology, art, or mathematics that operated on the same principle; and these could all be so planned as to fit together into an over-arching unity. Or instead of chopping cultures up into fields (which division itself would entail a certain way of looking at things), they could be studied as wholes with say a semester or so devoted to exploring every aspect of one culture in a concentrated effort to see how they all hang together in a central conception of man. A sequence of such "courses," each taking a different culture, might constitute the basic program. (Each of these possibilities has virtues and defects, the former ensuring that the subject be handled problematically and in detail, the latter guaranteeing that the particular areas of study would not be misconceived by studying them out of context.) Language study could not only be easily worked into such a program but would be a prime necessity, for the grammar and semantics of truly foreign languages often express ideas essential to the culture that are translated into a modern language at the price of much misunderstanding. One would not study four or five languages, but just to learn one fairly well significantly improves one's ability to sympathize with the basic ideas of foreign cultures and gives insights into the inherent presuppositions of one's own language.

The third world also offers a fruitful ground for the generation of the needed kind of thinking. There one can see the clash of the modern world with alternative conceptions of man still alive and kicking, whereas in the West the question has been "settled" and it requires an historical effort to recapture the liveliness of the confrontation. In fact, much of the cross cultural study indicated above could go under the banner of third world culture.

The details of this could be worked out without much difficulty, but it would seem that to accomplish its ends the study of older or foreign world views would have to be combined with a responsible, and hence somewhat detailed study of the contemporary state of knowledge as a series of mutually influencing areas of study. The sciences would have to be given a prominent role in recognition of their central function in modern culture. This seems necessary as the only guarantee against the diletantism that is too often found in this sort of thinking. This poses a greater problem of integration, but it does not appear insurmountable.

By far the most difficult aspect of the program would be the area of non-historical confrontations with the problems themselves. This area cannot be readily programmed and the way it was handled would depend almost entirely on the character of the faculty. Aside from expressing the hope that they would be responsibly imaginative there is little to do but allow them to do as they will with a minimum of interference. They would offer courses in areas that they are thinking about and students interested in that area would study with them. They might also give lectures to the whole community on these matters, and this would serve the purposes of cross-fertilization,

since by the nature of the basic idea everyone would be interested in everyone else's thinking. Students also might give such lectures and a senior project along these lines might be required.

Here then is a sketch, a mere outline, of what one program might be like which was a response to the interpretation of the educational crisis presented here. There are no doubt others which may be better or worse. But the important thing here is not the virtues or faults of this particular sketch of a program. This has not been a rationale for a program, but an attempt to explicate the depth of the educational dilemma with a possible solution attached for purposes of clarification. One could make a school out of this sketch, of course, but that is not the primary point. If we could only realize the true seriousness of the ferment in education and its commentary on our culture, then we could begin to make progress in the area of educational experimentation. Gimmicks or safe rehashes of the same stuff are no answer when the question is knowledge itself.